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Abstract 
Over the last 15 years, exchange rate movements have been smoother and slower 
than expected, given the entity of the sharp shifts in the fundamental variables 
brought about by the international financial crisis. Since the beginning of the ’90s 
researchers have explored different approaches in order to understand high frequency 
exchange rate dynamics. Among them the model that assumes heterogeneous trading 
strategies, where ‘fundamentalists’ coexist with ‘chartists’ in nonlinear transitional 
specifications, plays an increasingly relevant if puzzling role. 
We study the US dollar, the British pound and the Japanese yen vs the euro over the 
period 2002 to 2016 using weekly data. The most important contribution of this paper 
is that we find empirical evidence that both types of agent react to the same transition 
variable, viz. the absolute distance of the actual exchange rate to its relative PPP 
value. The spot foreign currency demand of fundamentalists is driven by the size of 
the misalignment both directly and through a transition function, which models the 
adoption of fundamental strategies by newcomers. The number of chartists also varies 
according to the absolute distance of the exchange rate change from its fundamental 
value. Evidence supports the existence of stabilizing and destabilizing behaviour not 
only by chartists but also by fundamentalists. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Modeling exchange rate dynamics has never been an easy task. Most fundamental 
models failed both to explain and to predict exchange rate movements in a 
consistent way over time and across currencies. A possible explanation is that 
there are important non linearities in the data, due to an endogenous price 
movement which results from the interaction of heterogeneous bounded-rational 
strategies  based both on technical and fundamental analysis.1 The heterogeneity 
of these strategies could be longitudinal, i.e vary across agents and over time, and 
produce in this way effects that could properly match the actual exchange rate 
dynamics.  
In a seminal work Frankel and Froot (1986) introduce a chartists fundamentalists 
approach in a foreign exchange model. They explain the movements of the US 
dollar in the eighties as the outcome of the interaction between fundamentalists’ 
long term trading strategies and chartists’ short term behaviour. 
Brock and Hommes (1997, 1998) and Westerhoff (2004), among many others, 
assume that different groups of agents condition their behaviour on differing types 
of information and beliefs. Westerhoff and Reitz (2005) analyse how deviations 
from a “believed” fundamental value weaken fundamentalists’ beliefs changing the 
number of agents in the market, with consequences on stability. In their paper 
chartists were only of the trend follower type.  
Switching mechanisms are modelled according to past performances (Boswijk et al 
2007), fundamental prices (Manzan and Westerhoff, 2007), accuracy of past 
forecasts (de Jong et al., 2010, Prat and Unctum, 2015) and business cycle 
indexes (Lof, 2012). Alternatively, they are attributed to changes in expectations 
                                                          
1 See, among many others, De Grauwe and Vansteenkiste  (2007), Menkhoff  et al. (2009), de Jong 
et al. 2010, ter Ellen et al. (2013), Chia et al. (2014) and Flaschel et al. (2015). 
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based on some unobserved factors in financial markets, governed by a Markov 
process (Chiarella et al., 2012).   
This paper extends the previous literature adding several features. 
- Because of its dimension, depth and liquidity, and of its geographical extension, 
the foreign exchange market is a privileged field of analysis for heterogeneous 
agents models. Most empirical studies, however, impose too many ex-ante 
restrictions and are vulnerable to a data snooping criticism. We include almost 
no a-priori restrictions in our analysis and the selected specification is data 
driven. 
- In our research we allow for a differing behaviour among traders of the same 
category, be they chartists or fundamentalists. Some alter their reaction over 
time and account for the regime shifting component and others are impervious 
to changes and maintain their presence in the market irrespectively of the 
changes of the transition variable. We introduce in this way a second 
classification, between resilient and regime shifting market agents. 
- Both fundamentalists and chartists may change their reaction over time and 
over regimes. Wan and Kao (2012) introduce contrarian noise trading 
behaviour in their analysis without relating it, however, as we do in our paper 
to misalignements with respect to a chosen anchor value. Furthermore, we 
assume that fundamentalists too may behave as contrarians and have a 
destabilizing reaction to market disequilibrium. In periods of extreme financial 
and exchange rate turmoil a homogeneous stabilizing fundamentalist market 
reaction cannot be imposed a-priori and has to be tested empirically.   
Indeed, the empirical analysis shows that, in the same time period, pricing 
efficiency is not homogeneous across exchange rates. The US dollar euro exchange 
3 
 
rate seems to be priced in a more efficient way than the Japanese yen euro or the 
British pound euro rates. 
The paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the model, the 
characteristics of trading agents as well as the effects brought about by the 
simultaneous implementation of different strategies. We present the data and the 
non-linear transition econometric model in Section 3. The empirical results are set 
forth in Section 4. Section 5 concludes the paper.  
 
2. The econometric model: trading strategies and their impact on the 
exchange rate 
In this section we discuss how changes in the trading behaviour of heterogenous 
agents affect exchange rate determination. The usual distinction applies, if trading 
strategies depend only on the past history of the exchange rate the agents are 
defined “chartists”, if they depend on external information used to assess a long 
term fundamental value the agents are called “fundamentalists”. Chartists can be 
further classified as trend followers or contrarians according to whether they trade 
following the trend or they do the reverse. The final effect on the exchange rate 
will depend on the interaction between different types of agents and will vary over 
time since agents can decide to enter or exit the market according to a transition 
function geared to the gap between the spot exchange rate and its long-term 
equilibrium value. 
Given the high degree of uncertainty and disagreement which characterizes the 
foreign exchange markets (Ellen ter et al. 2016), most agents will review 
periodically their arbitraging performance and their beliefs. When substantial losses 
occur they may lose credibility (with their principals) or run out of liquidity. Short-
terminism applies as agents with a poor performance may have to leave the 
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market, without having the time to recoup an eventual shortfall. Indeed, traders' 
confidence is likely to decline if the exchange rate deviates from the value 
expected according to the adopted rule. This phenomenon is modeled introducing a 
confidence function (the transition function) that accounts for the shifts in the 
number of each type of active trader in the market. In our model, two LSTAR 
transition functions, 𝑔𝐹  and 𝑔𝐶, apply respectively to fundamentalists and to 
chartists. 
a. Fundamentalists 
The fundamentalists’ trading strategy assumes that the actual exchange rate will 
revert towards its fundamental value. Their foreign currency demand function 
reads as follows: 
 
𝐷𝑡
𝐹 =  𝑎1𝑔𝑡
𝐹(Δ𝑓𝑡 − Δs𝑡) + 𝑎2 (Δ𝑓𝑡 − Δ𝑠𝑡)            (1) 
 
where 𝑓𝑡 and 𝑠𝑡 denote, respectively, the logs of the fundamental and spot 
exchange rates, quoted as number of units of domestic currency per euro. There 
is a lack of consensus on the true drivers of the equilibrium exchange rate (Sarno 
and Taylor, 2002). Nonetheless as anchor value of the exchange rate in the long-
run most models use either the purchasing power parity (PPP) or the uncovered 
interest rate parity (UIP).  
In this paper 𝑓𝑡 is the equilibrium value of the spot exchange rate according to the 
relative PPP hypothesis.2 In equation (1) we assume that fundamentalists react to 
deviations from the relative PPP, buying foreign currency if the rate of change of 
the spot exchange rate Δ𝑠𝑡 is lower than Δ𝑓𝑡 and selling foreign currency if the 
                                                          
2  We also tried the UIP anchor and obtained poor empirical results. 
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reverse is true, which implies that both 𝑎1 and 𝑎2  will be positive.
3 In equation (1) 
we draw a distinction between fundamentalists that are always active on the 
market (resilient) and those that enter or exit the market according to their beliefs 
(regime shifting). The inclusion of 𝑔𝐹, which denotes a LSTAR transition function, 
is justified, as pointed out by Wan and Kao (2009), by the impact on speculators 
confidence of past performances i.e. by the entity of the deviations of past values 
of the exchange rate changes from their fundamental value. Following Westerhoff 
and Reitz (2005) we model the confidence/transition function as follows: 
 
𝑔𝑡,𝑑
𝐹 =
1
1 + 𝑒
−𝛾𝐹
|Δ𝑓𝑡−𝑑−Δ𝑠𝑡−𝑑|
𝜎Δ𝑠𝑡−𝑑̂
            (2) 
 
Where 𝑑, the delay parameter, is the number of lags with which the transition 
variable |Δ𝑓𝑡 − Δ𝑠𝑡| enters the LSTAR function and reflects frictions in the price 
setting mechanism. We impose no ex-ante hypothesis on the sign of 𝛾𝐹. Hence the 
number of fundamentalists entering the market, differently from the standard 
approach, may vary from 0 to 1. If 𝛾𝐹 > 0 fundamentalists believe in the mean 
reversion property of the real exchange rate i.e. that deviations from the relative 
PPP are only temporary. When 𝛾𝐹 < 0, they no longer believe that the relative PPP 
is an attractor and leave the market (Kao et al 2015).4 The speed of agents’ 
reaction and the heterogeneity of beliefs is quantified by the absolute value of 𝛾𝐹. 
                                                          
3 Fundamentalists may however believe that the persistence of the misalignment will last for some 
time, in which case 𝑎1 and 𝑎2  will be negative (i.e. they persist to buy/sell foreign currency if Δ𝑠𝑡 
larger/smaller than Δ𝑓𝑡). This is a symptom of the failure of the price signaling process that may occur 
in periods of turbulence. Reitz and Taylor (2008) label this loss of confidence in fundamentals a 
“coordination failure” since a single agent will be afraid to trade against the market even if 
fundamentals would suggest to do so. 
4 Shleifer and Vishny (1997) were the first to point out that fundamentalists, if trades based on their 
own forecasts turn out to be persistently incorrect, will be wary to enter the market.  
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Finally, the transition variable |Δ𝑓𝑡 − Δ𝑠𝑡| is normalised using the conditional 
standard deviation of the exchange rate change Δ𝑠𝑡−𝑑. 
b. Chartists  
Chartists focus on past exchange rate movements only. Their foreign currency 
demand function reads as 
 
𝐷𝑡
𝐶 = 𝑏1𝑔𝑡
𝐶Δ𝑠𝑡 + 𝑏2 Δ𝑠𝑡           (3) 
 
Chartists are partitioned in two fractions: one, resilient, is always trading while the 
other, regime shifting, enters or exits the market according the LSTAR transition 
function 𝑔𝐶. The properties of the latter are analogous to those of the 
fundamentalist equation (2) and reflect the reaction of chartists to the size of real 
exchange rate misalignment. 
 
𝑔𝑡,𝑑
𝐶 =
1
1 + 𝑒
−𝛾𝐶
|Δ𝑓𝑡−𝑑−Δ𝑠𝑡−𝑑|
𝜎Δ𝑠𝑡−𝑑̂
            (4) 
 
Here too, no restrictions are set on the sign of 𝛾𝐶 and consequently shifts in the 
transition variable may bring about either an increase or a decrease in the number 
of active chartists. Chartists will behave as trend followers when 𝑏1 and 𝑏2 are 
positive or as contrarians when 𝑏1 and 𝑏2 are negative. As it is well known, 
exchange rate may overshoot. In this case contrarians are stabilizers since they 
bring about price reversals by betting against the current trend. 
c. Combining trading behaviours and the role of the transition function 
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Exchange rates are set in an order driven market where trading positions are 
revised every period. Hence exchange rate changes from t to t+1 are a function of 
the excess demands of fundamentalists and chartists and are parameterized by the 
following log-linear function 
 
𝑠𝑡+1 = 𝑠𝑡 + 𝜃(𝐷𝑡
𝐹 + 𝐷𝑡
𝐶) + 𝑢𝑡+1           (5) 
 
𝑢𝑡+1 accounts for the remaining determinants of exchange rate dynamics. Inserting 
equations (1) to (4) into equation (5) we obtain  
 
Δ𝑠𝑡+1 = 𝑒0 + 𝑒1𝑔𝑡−𝑑𝑓
𝐹
 
(Δ𝑓𝑡 − Δ𝑠𝑡) + 𝑒2(Δ𝑓𝑡 − Δ𝑠𝑡) + 𝑒3𝑔𝑡−𝑑𝐶
𝐶 Δ𝑠𝑡 + 𝑒4Δ𝑠𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡+1          (6) 
 
Where  𝑒1 =  𝜃𝑎1, 𝑒2 =  𝜃𝑎2 , 𝑒3 =  𝜃𝑏1, and 𝑒4 =  𝜃𝑏2. Exchange rate movements 
reflect the interactions of the orders of heterogeneous traders.  
 
3. Data and model specification 
a. Data description 
Our weekly exchange rate data span the 3 January 2002 – 4 August 2016 time- 
period and are taken from Bloomberg. The descriptive statistics are set out in 
Table 1. We recall here, for the sake of clarity, that the currencies we study - US 
dollar, GB pound, Japanese yen – are defined as the number of units of domestic 
currency per units of foreign currency (i.e. euro). The endogenous variable Δ𝑠𝑡 is 
the first difference of the log of the exchange rate since as expected exchange 
rates are not stationary in levels, see Figure 1.  
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<INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE> 
 
Δ(𝑓𝑡 − 𝑠𝑡) measures the weekly deviations from the relative purchasing power 
parity, where the price indexes are monthly CPI from the OECD Database.  
VIX is the market expectation of near term volatility conveyed by the S&P100 
stock index option prices from the CBOE database, which provides also the Skew 
Index, a measure of a potential tail risk-return of two or three standard deviations 
below the mean in the S&P500 index over the next 30 days.  All the time series are 
stationary but neither normal nor conditionally homoskedastic.  The VIX and Skew 
indexes, which provide proxies for shifts in the sentiment of investors, are used at 
first as tentative transition variables in the switching function and subsequently to 
date changes in the number of agents entering the markets.  
 
<INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE> 
 
b. Model specification 
Since exchange rates changes are conditionally heteroskedastic when sampled with 
a weekly frequency, a GARCH (1,1) is used to model the variances 𝜎Δ𝑠𝑡−𝑑 that enter 
equations (2) and (4). Equation (7) - the empirical version of equation (6) - 
parameterizes the corresponding conditional mean:  
 
Δ𝑠𝑡 = 𝑒0 + 𝑒1𝑔𝑡−1−𝑑𝐹
𝐹
 
(Δ𝑓𝑡−1 − Δ𝑠𝑡−1) + 𝑒2(Δ𝑓𝑡−1 − Δ𝑠𝑡−1) + 𝑒3𝑔𝑡−1−𝑑𝐶
𝐶 Δ𝑠𝑡−1 + 𝑒4Δ𝑠𝑡−1 + 𝜖𝑡       (7) 
Where  
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𝑔𝑡−1−𝑑𝐹
𝐹 =
1
1 + 𝑒−𝛾
𝐹
|Δ𝑓𝑡−1−𝑑𝐹
−Δ𝑠𝑡−1−𝑑𝐹
|
ℎ𝑡−1−𝑑𝐹
            (8) 
𝑔𝑡−1−𝑑𝐶
𝐶 =
1
1 + 𝑒−𝛾
𝐶
|Δ𝑓𝑡−1−𝑑𝐶
−Δ𝑠𝑡−1−𝑑𝐶
|
ℎ𝑡−1−𝑑𝐶
            (9) 
and the GARCH (1,1) parameterization is  
 
ℎ𝑡
2 =  𝜔 + 𝛼𝜖𝑡−1
2 + 𝛽ℎ𝑡−1
2    (10) 
𝜈𝑡|Ω𝑡−1~𝑁(0,1) 
  
𝜈𝑡 being the standardized residual of equation (7). 
In this paper a regime shifting fraction of the economic agents – be they 
fundamentalists or chartists - has beliefs on the long term reliability of the anchor 
(i.e. the relative PPP) which are affected by the size of the misalignment according 
to a logistic reaction function (equations (8) and (9)) controlled by the sign and the 
absolute value of 𝛾. More precisely, the sign of 𝛾 indicates whether they believe or 
not in the economic significance of the long run equilibrium and its absolute value 
defines the homogeneity of their reaction.  
A-priori we would expect the fundamentalists to stabilize the exchange rate, and 
the sign of 𝑒1  and 𝑒2 to be positive. We found, however, some exceptions with 
destabilizing fundamentalists and negative 𝑒1  and 𝑒2 parameters. Coefficients with 
opposite signs are also frequent in the case of chartists. We label them trend 
followers if 𝑒3 and 𝑒4 are positive, and contrarians if 𝑒3  and 𝑒4 are negative. 
Equation (7), moreover, does not rule out the possibility of having simultaneously 
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stabilizing and destabilizing behaviours within the same category of agents (i.e. 𝑒1  
and 𝑒2 (𝑒3 and 𝑒4) of opposite signs). 
As for the transition function, if the misalignment is very large and  𝛾𝐹 > 0 , then 
𝑔𝐹 = 1 and both resilient and market sensitive speculators will be active in the 
market. If  𝛾𝐹 < 0, the confidence of fundamentalists on current pricing decreases 
as the deviation rises. In this case - for very large misalignments - 𝑔𝐹 could 
collapse to zero, leaving only resilient fundamentalists on the market. The same 
reasoning holds for chartists.  
This specification generalises the standard approach set out by Westerhoff and 
Reitz (2005) where 𝛾 is assumed a-priori to be positive, which implies that fifty 
percent of the speculators at least are always trading on the market and no 
distinction is drawn between market sensitive and resilient speculators 
 
4. Estimation results 
a.  Model estimation  
Table 2 presents maximum likelihood estimates of the logistic smooth transition 
regime switching GARCH system set out in equations (7) to (10). The adopted 
parameterization is justified by the strategy set out by Teräsvirta (1994.a). At first, 
the lag of the autoregressive exchange rate log difference is selected using the 
Akaike Information Criterion: a one-week lag provides the best fit.5 A test of 
linearity against the non-linear parameterization of equation (7) is performed 
following the procedure of Luukkonen at al. (1988), as modified by Wan and Kao 
(2009). The transition functions (8) and (9) are replaced in equation (7) by a third 
order Taylor series approximation. The following auxiliary equation is estimated   
                                                          
5 As suggested by Teräsvirta (1994.a, p. 211), using the SBIC order selection criterion in this context 
may lead “to too parsimonious a model in the sense that the estimated residuals of the selected 
model are not free from serial correlation”. 
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Δ𝑠𝑡 = 𝜋0 + 𝜋1(Δ𝑓𝑡−1 − Δ𝑠𝑡−1) + 𝜋2(Δ𝑓𝑡−1 − Δ𝑠𝑡−1)𝑤𝑡−1−𝑑𝐹 + 𝜋3(Δ𝑓𝑡−1 − Δ𝑠𝑡−1)𝑤𝑡−1−𝑑𝐹
2 + 
                                                                                                                 (11) 
𝜋4(Δ𝑓𝑡−1 − Δ𝑠𝑡−1)𝑤𝑡−1−𝑑𝐹
3 + 𝜇1Δ𝑠𝑡−1 + 𝜇2Δ𝑠𝑡−1𝑤𝑡−1−𝑑𝐶 + 𝜇3Δ𝑠𝑡−1𝑤𝑡−1−𝑑𝐶
2 + 𝜇4Δ𝑠𝑡−1𝑤𝑡−1−𝑑𝐶
3 + 𝜖𝑡  
 
where,     𝑤𝑡−𝑘 =  |Δ𝑓𝑡−1−𝑘 − Δ𝑠𝑡−1−𝑘|,    𝑘 =  𝑑𝐹 , 𝑑𝐶. 
We test linearity against STAR modeling - for various values of 𝑑𝐹  and 𝑑𝐶 - 
performing LM tests of the null hypothesis 𝐻0: 𝜋2 =  𝜋3 =  𝜋4 = 𝜇2 = 𝜇3 = 𝜇4 = 0.  For 
the values of the delay parameters of the first row of Table 3, the T.N.T. statistics 
uniformly reject 𝐻0. Our non linear parameterization is thus justified by the data 
and the time-varying fractions of chartists and fundamentalists in equation (7) are 
parameterized using equations (8) and (9).6 
 
<INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE> 
 
The overall quality of fit of the estimates, set out in Table 2, is satisfactory. The 
parameters of both the conditional mean and conditional variance relationships are 
significantly different from zero and have meaningful signs. The usual 
misspecification tests suggest that the standardized residuals 𝜈𝑡  are well behaved 
and that the serial correlation and heteroskedasticity of the original return time 
series are captured by the model (𝐸(𝜈𝑡) = 0, 𝐸( 𝜈𝑡
2) = 1, and both 𝜈𝑡  and 𝜈𝑡
2 are 
serially uncorrelated).  
According to the sign of the coefficients, resilient fundamentalists behave similarly 
for all three exchange rates as the corresponding coefficient  𝑒2  estimates are 
                                                          
6 The Taylor procedure allows us to reject the alternative ESTAR parameterization of the transition function. For the 
sake of parsimony these tests are not reported here. 
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always negative. This destabilizing behaviour is systematically dampened by the 
regime shifting fundamentalists whose presence in the market grows with the size 
of the disequilibrium (𝑒1 > 0). The absolute value of 𝛾
𝐹 is ten times larger in the 
case of the US dollar than for the pound and the yen; this indicates a much smaller 
uncertainty about the long run value of the US dollar (i.e. about the corresponding 
relative PPP). Further the positive sign of 𝛾𝐹 indicates that fundamentalists believe 
in the economic value of this long run attractor as measured by the market. 
As for the chartists, we obtain fuzzier results. In the case of the dollar and the 
pound, resilient chartists are contrarians and play a stabilizing role whereas regime 
shifting chartists are trend followers and destabilize the market. For the yen, the 
opposite is the case. Here too, the absolute value of 𝛾𝐶 is much larger in the case 
of the US dollar than in the case of the pound. Its positive sign reflects the 
credibility of the relative PPP measure. As for the yen, the results are completely 
different and reflect a much greater uncertainty: the absolute value of 𝛾𝐶 is very 
low and the corresponding sign is negative. Hence greater misalignments bring 
about a reduction in the number of chartists, who no longer believe in the 
economic significance of the relative PPP derived from market prices.7 
 
<INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE> 
 
In Table 3, besides the non-linearity test of Teräsvirta (1994.b) discussed above, 
we find the test of Eitrheim and Teräsvirta (1996). It is used to assess the 
presence of non-linearity in the estimated standardized residual of equation (7). 
                                                          
7 In testing the proper empirical model, we also try the case with no resilient speculators on the market. Overall, 
according to the LR test, this kind of parameterization is either strongly rejected (for the US dollar and the British 
pound) or turns out to be without any reasonable meaning (for the Japanese yen). 
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The R.N.T. statistics of the second row are never significant and fail to reject the 
null of no residual post estimation non-linearity. 
b. Stability and dynamic interactions of trading behaviours 
In order to assess the overall impact on exchange rate movements of the different 
categories of agents we compute weighted sums of the corresponding estimated 
coefficients of equation (7). That is to say we calculate the sums (𝑒1𝑔𝐹̅̅̅̅ + 𝑒2) and 
(𝑒3𝑔𝐶̅̅̅̅ + 𝑒4) where 𝑔𝐹̅̅̅̅  and 𝑔𝐶̅̅̅̅  are the average values of the transition function time 
series over the corresponding time periods. We report them in Table 4.  
 
<INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE> 
 
For the US dollar, fundamentalists play a stabilizing role throughout whereas 
chartists are always destabilizers. The opposite holds true for the GB pound and 
the Japanese yen: in both cases the composite aggregates of chartists (resilient 
and market sensitive) tend to stabilize the exchange rate and of fundamentalists to 
destabilize it.8  
These results provide further support for the hypothesis of a greater efficiency of 
the US dollar currency market. At the same time the role of chartists, especially for 
the pound and the yen, displays an increasing sophistication and justifies our 
hypothesis of relating their temporary presence to an assessment of the long-term 
market disequilibrium.  
 
<INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE> 
 
                                                          
8 Frenkel et al. (2009) find that contrarian beliefs are predominant in the yen market whilst the reverse is true for 
the dollar exchange rate. 
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Figure 2 depicts the impact over time of resilient and regime shifting speculators. 
It provides additional insights into their destabilizing or stabilizing behaviour, which 
is strongly affected by the size of the deviations from the relative PPP. In the case 
of US dollar, both for chartists and fundamentalists, large deviations from the long 
term equilibrium bring about switches in the sign of the coefficients: 
fundamentalists become stabilizers whereas for small misalignements they are 
destabilizing contrarians and, on the other hand, chartists become trend followers 
while, for small deviations, they behave as contrarians. As for the UK pound, 
switches in sign occur only for chartists that become trend followers when the 
deviations from the relative PPP are large. For the Japanese yen too, chartists 
modify their behaviour in the case of large misalignments and become trend 
followers.  
 
<INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE> 
 
A more accurate analysis of the dynamics of the interaction between chartists and 
fundamentalists is therefore called for.9 Taking into account the combinations of 
positive and negative values of the explicative variables, which reflect the trading 
strategies of chartists and fundamentalists, any shock to the system is absorbed in 
a stable framework in the case of the US dollar, and in a saddle point equilibrium 
path in the case of the pound and the yen (see Table 5). The latter would require - 
whenever out of the saddle path as in cases (1) and (4) - an exchange rate policy 
intervention. 
 
 
                                                          
9 The results of Table 5 are based on the average impacts set out in Table 4 and are obtained from the ML estimation 
of the transition functions. 
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c. Further investigations 
As final investigation of the informative content of our estimates we analyze, in 
Table 6, the correlation between proxies of market uncertainty, such as the VIX 
and the Skew indexes, and the time series that measure the portion of agents 
active in the foreign exchange rate markets according to the estimates of 
equations (8) and (9).  
In the case of the US dollar traders are not sensitive to an increase in uncertainty 
(i.e. to a rise in the VIX index) whereas in both the pound and the yen markets 
both fundamentalists and chartists seem to react significantly to it. As expected, in 
the case of Japan, the number of chartists declines as uncertainty rises. 
Interestingly the correlation with the skew index (that is with an increasing 
likelihood of extreme events) is showing a strong negative relation only with the 
chartists in the US dollar market, as if their confidence in the model were to 
decrease only in extremes cases. 
 
<INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE> 
 
As final test of the quality of the fit we compute in sample RMSE and MAE statistics 
(Table 7) associated with three differing parameterizations of the exchange rate 
returns: the nonlinear model (equations (7) to (10)), a linear version of equation 
(7), and the standard random walk model. We find that the LSTAR specification 
outperforms the remaining ones, and provides always the smaller statistics. 
 
<INSERT TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE> 
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5. Conclusions  
This paper provides two innovative results. Strong empirical evidence is found that 
resilient and market sensitive regime shifting speculators behave differently: the 
former tend to destabilize the exchange rates whilst the latter tend to stabilize it 
(in the case of chartists the opposite is true, with the exception of the Japanese 
yen). Moreover, regime shifting speculators, be they chartists or fundamentalists, 
react to the same transition variable, viz. to the absolute distance of the actual 
exchange rate to its relative PPP value. Contrary to common beliefs, a real 
indicator such as the real exchange rate misalignment affects the spot exchange 
rate movements also in the short term. Indeed, the long-term disequilibrium 
affects the short term demand of fundamentalists both directly and through a 
transition function, which models the adoption of fundamental strategies by new 
comers. In the same way the number of chartists, who react to the past exchange 
rate dynamics, varies according to the absolute distance of the exchange rate from 
its fundamental value. An accurate analysis of the overall impact of chartists 
detects the presence of contrarian trading in the British pound and the Japanese 
yen markets, and of trend following in the US dollar market. In the case of 
fundamentalists too the standard reactions seem to be reversed: to a stabilizing 
behavior in the US dollar market corresponds a destabilizing one in the remaining 
markets. Moreover, the confidence of the market participants in the long-term 
value of the exchange rate is highly heterogeneous and varies from a high degree 
in the case of the US dollar to a lower one in the case of the Japanese yen leaving 
in a middle rank the pound.  
Finally, analyzing the stability characteristics of the systems we find that a shock is 
fully absorbed in the US market where the system shows a stable equilibrium and 
fails to do so in the case of the remaining markets where the systems return to the 
equilibrium only under given circumstances. 
17 
 
We conclude this paper noting that a clear-cut distinction between stabilizing 
fundamentalist speculators, who react to price misalignments, and destabilizing 
chartist trend followers does not seem to hold. Whether this phenomenon is due to 
the extremely turbulent time period over which we perform our research or to 
technological/institutional innovations that have altered the behaviour of chartists 
and fundamentalists lies outside the scope of this paper and constitutes the topic 
of further research.  
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TABLE 1. Descriptive Statistics 
 
 Δ𝑠𝑈𝑆𝐷 Δ𝑠𝐺𝐵𝑃 Δ𝑠𝑌𝐸𝑁  Δ(𝑓𝑡 − 𝑠𝑡)𝑈𝑆𝐷 Δ(𝑓𝑡 − 𝑠𝑡)𝐺𝐵𝑃  Δ(𝑓𝑡 − 𝑠𝑡)𝑌𝐸𝑁  VIX SKEW 
Index 
Mean 0.029 0.043 -0.005 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 19.937 120.603 
Std.Dev. 1.149 0.942 1.361 0.012 0.010 0.014 9.063 6.398 
Skew. -0.061 0.372 -0.610 0.039 -0.795 0.592 2.334 0.594 
Kurt. 4.745 5.625 6.841 4.567 7.989 6.538 10.849 3.301 
JB 97.221 
[0.000] 
236.419 
[0.000] 
515.800 
[0.000] 
78.152 
[0.000] 
870.655 
[0.000] 
442.128 
[0.000] 
2648.031 
[0.000] 
47.711 
[0.000] 
ARCH(1) 6.818 
[0.009] 
104.680 
[0.000] 
16.217 
[0.000] 
9.940 
[0.002] 
107.090 
[0.000] 
17.088 
[0.000] 
633.010 
[0.000] 
590.140 
[0.000] 
ARCH(5) 26.638 
[0.000] 
317.950 
[0.000] 
125.915 
[0.000] 
28.690 
[0.000] 
239.420 
[0.000] 
121.080 
[0.000] 
2634.100 
[0.000] 
2240.300 
[0.000] 
ADF(n) -21.772 
[0.000] 
 19.424 
[0.000] 
-22.639 
[0.000] 
-21.954 
[0.000] 
-18.232 
[0.000] 
-22.466 
[0.000] 
-4.042 c 
[0.001] 
-4.822 c,t 
[0.000] 
 
Notes. Probability values in square brackets; Skew: Skewness; Kurt: Excess Kurtosis; JB: Jarque-Bera 
normality test; ARCH(n): Ljung-Box test statistic for n-th order serial correlation of the squared time 
series; ADF(n): Augmented Dickey Fuller unit root test statistic, with nth order autoregressive component 
(n=1 for  Δ𝑠𝑡, n=0 for 𝑓𝑡 − 𝑠𝑡, n=2 in the case of VIX and n=7 in the S.I. ADF test). In the case of the VIX 
index, which seems to be affected by a relevant regime shift, the breakpoint unit root test of Vogelsang 
and Perron (1998) provided qualitatively analogous results. The data have a weekly frequency over the 
sample period 3 January 2002 - 4 August 2016. 
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TABLE 2. Model estimates: equations (7) to (10) 
 
 
US dollars per euro 
[𝑑𝐹 = 7, 𝑑𝐶 = 0] 
GB pounds per euro 
[𝑑𝐹 = 4, 𝑑𝐶 = 0] 
JP yens per euro 
[𝑑𝐹 = 1, 𝑑𝐶 = 1] 
𝑒0 0.0281 
(0.8422) 
0.0149 
(0.5815)   
0.0304 
(0.7935) 
𝑒1 109.1408 
(3.8650) 
26.2579 
(2.1964)      
150.7238 
(1.8218) 
𝑒2 -99.4553 
(-2.9108) 
-39.5982 
(-3.8766)   
-155.9194 
(-2.6881) 
𝑒3 2.2708 
(24.5202) 
0.8969 
(2.7884)   
-55.3928 
(-11.1127) 
𝑒4 -1.9760 
(-17.5894) 
-0.8205 
(-2.8921)   
27.1415 
(12.1159) 
𝛾𝐹 1394.8754 
(4.1447) 
129.0167 
(1.9400)   
112.6703 
(3.0325) 
𝛾𝐶  552.9423 
(5.0361) 
120.2641 
(3.4354) 
-1.9367 
(-1.7069) 
𝜔 0.0244 
(2.0914) 
0.0196 
(2.2153) 
0.0493 
(2.4148) 
𝛼 0.0696 
(4.9860) 
0.0847 
(4.4577)   
0.1117 
(3.4046) 
𝛽 0.9114 
(69.9868) 
0.8934 
(36.1779) 
0.8648 
(31.1214) 
LLF -1126.2732 -951.5951 -1237.0837 
 𝜈𝑡 =
𝜖𝑡
√ℎ𝑡
⁄  𝜈𝑡 =
𝜖𝑡
√ℎ𝑡
⁄  𝜈𝑡 =
𝜖𝑡
√ℎ𝑡
⁄  
AR(1) 0.345 
[0.5571] 
0.201 
[ 0.6542] 
0.998 
[0.3179] 
AR(2) 0.558 
[0.7566] 
3.339 
[0.1883] 
3.924 
[0.1406] 
AR(5) 3.158 
[0.6757] 
4.989 
[0.4173] 
9.187 
[0.1018] 
ARCH(1) 0.9279  
[0.3354] 
0.4875  
[0.4850] 
 0.0898 
 [0.7644] 
ARCH(2) 6.0163 
 [0.0493] 
0.4796  
[0.7867] 
0.1356 
[0.9344] 
ARCH(5) 7.9417 
[0.1595] 
7.4569 
 [0.1888] 
9.1079 
[0.1048] 
JB 9.5631 
[0.0083] 
30.8906 
[0.0000]      
47.7924 
[0.0000] 
   E[𝜈𝑡] -0.0104 0.0132       -0.0230 
E[𝜈𝑡
2] 0.9666 0.9604       0.9853 
Sk. -0.2063   0.2217       -0.2625 
Kurt. 0.3341 0.8391       1.0637 
Notes: The conditional normality of the standardised residuals is rejected, and the t-ratios reported on this 
table are based on the quasi-maximum likelihood estimation procedure of Bollerslev and Wooldridge 
(1992). 
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TABLE 3. Tests of non-linearity  
Tests  US dollars per euro GB pounds per euro JP yens per euro 
Delay parameters [𝑑𝐹 = 7, 𝑑𝐶 = 0] [𝑑𝐹 = 4, 𝑑𝐶 = 0] [𝑑𝐹 = 1, 𝑑𝐶 = 1] 
T.N.T. 2.1234 
[0.0485] 
3.5176 
[0.0019] 
2.7115 
[0.0130] 
R.N.T. 1.3676 
[0.2158] 
1.6320 
[0.1231] 
0.5790 
[0.7472] 
Notes. T.N.T.: Teräsvirta (1994.b) test of nonlinearity; R.N.T.: Eitrheim and Teräsvirta (1996) test of no 
remaining nonlinearity. 
 
TABLE 4. Stabilizing vs destabilizing impact of fundamentalists and chartists 
 Fundamentalists Chartists* 
US dollar 2.7278 
stab 
4.0520 
dest 
GB pound  -10.4739 
dest 
-9.6328 
stab 
JP yen -25.8927 
dest 
-16.8979 
stab 
Note: *The coefficients have been multiplied by 100 to allow comparison with the coefficients of the 
fundamentalists. Subsample estimations (before and after the Lehman crisis) do not contradict the full 
sample results. 
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TABLE 5. Dynamic interaction between fundamentalists and chartists  
US dollars per euro 
 01  ts  01  ts  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 0)( 1  tsf  0)( 1  tsf  0)( 1  tsf  0)( 1  tsf  
Chartists Sell $ 
0 ts  
Sell $ 
0 ts  
Buy $ 
0 ts  
Buy $ 
0 ts  
Fundamentalists Sell $ 
0 ts  
Buy $ 
0 ts  
Sell $ 
0 ts  
Buy $ 
0 ts  
Spot exchange 
rate impact 
Rapid 
depreciation 
0 ts . The 
system switches 
to (2) when 
fst   
Fundamentalists 
take long positions 
dampening the 
depreciation 
pressure due to 
chartists’ sales 
Fundamentalists 
take short 
positions 
dampening the 
appreciation 
pressure due to 
chartists’ 
purchases. 
Rapid 
appreciation 
0 ts . The 
system switches 
to (3) when 
fst    
 
GB pounds per euro and JP yens per euro  
 01  ts  01  ts  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 0)( 1  tsf  0)( 1  tsf  0)( 1  tsf  0)( 1  tsf  
Chartists Buy £, ¥ 
0 ts  
Buy £, ¥ 
0 ts  
Sell £, ¥ 
0 ts  
Sell £, ¥ 
0 ts  
Fundamentalists Buy £, ¥ 
0 ts  
Sell £, ¥ 
0 ts  
Buy £, ¥ 
0 ts  
Sell £, ¥ 
0 ts  
Spot exchange 
rate  impact 
Rapid 
appreciation 
0 ts . The 
system is 
unstable as
fst   
Fundamentalists 
take short 
positions 
dampening the 
appreciation 
pressure due to 
chartists’ 
purchases. 
Fundamentalists 
take long 
positions 
dampening the 
depreciation 
pressure due to 
chartists’ 
purchases. 
Rapid 
depreciation 
0 ts .  
The system is 
unstable as
fst    
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Table 6. Correlation Analysis between VIX and Skew index and the number of 
active agents in the markets 
VIX index 
 US dollar GB pound JP yen 
Chartists 0.0270 
(0.7460) 
0.0754** 
(2.0858) 
-0.0954*** 
(-2.6439) 
Fundamentalists -0.1014 
(-0.4117) 
0.1060*** 
(2.9394) 
0.0631* 
(1.7423) 
 
Skew Index 
 US dollar GB pound JP yen 
Chartists -0.1105*** 
(-3.066) 
0.0030 
(0.0851) 
-0.0249 
(-0.6872) 
Fundamentalists 0.0026 
(0.0716) 
-0.0032 
(-0.0089) 
0.0113 
(0.3138)) 
Notes: Student-t ratios in parentheses; *, **, and *** denote, respectively the 10, 5, and 1 percentage 
levels of significance.  
 
Table 7. Relative in sample forecasting accuracy 
RMSE 
 US dollar GB pound JP yen 
LSTAR 1.101686 0.915406 1.321510 
LINEAR 1.110677 0.921791 1.322960 
RANDOM WALK 1.144570 2.054049 1.355349 
 
MAE 
 US dollar GB pound JP yen 
LSTAR 0.848967 0.614221 0.960359 
LINEAR 0.855979 0.681526 0.963268 
RANDOM WALK 0.885040 0.706655 1.006016 
 
Notes: RMSE: Root Mean Square Error; MAE: Mean Absolute Error. 
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FIGURE 2 
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